


MINICRYPT

The world in which OWFs exist.



MINICRYPT

← THEORY

PRACTICE

Plan :

AES
(PRF)

$$G(s) = \tau$$

1) $PRG \Rightarrow SKE$

2) $OWF \Rightarrow PRG$

First thing: What's secure encryption?

1) No PPT A can compute k !

$$E_{mc}(k, m) = m \quad (\text{w.p.} \geq \text{negl}(\lambda))$$

2) No PPT A can compute m

$$(\text{w.p.} \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)})$$

Still, A could learn $m[1]$ ← FIRST BIT of m

3) A (PPT) learns nothing about m
(besides what's known about m)

(3) can be done, but results are complex
 def. GOLDWASSER + MICALI give


sumpter equivalent definition.

DEF (ONE-TIME SEC. SKEM). $\Pi = (Enc, Dec)$

is ONE-TIME-^{one-time} COMP. SECURE if:

$\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{one-time}(\lambda, 0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{one-time}(\lambda, 1)$
 $\text{GAME}(\lambda, b)$

A



$\mathcal{C} \quad k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$
 $c = Enc(k, m_b)$

DEF \Rightarrow (1). Assume not; \exists PPT A'
 That given c outputs k . Then construct
 PPT A :

- Pick any m_0, m_1
- Receive c ; run A' on c get k .
- Let $m = \text{Dec}(k, c)$
- Output $b' = \tilde{b}$ iff $m = m_{\tilde{b}}$

$$\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0 \text{ on the game}] = 0$$

$$\Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1 \text{ " " "}] = 1$$

Construction: Let $G: \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+l}$ be

a PRG. Consider $\Pi = (Enc, Dec)$:


$$- Enc(k, m) = G(k) \oplus m$$

$$- Dec(k, c) = G(k) \oplus c$$

Note $|k| = \lambda$; $|m| = \lambda + l$ ($l > 0$)

Thm. If G is a PRG, Π is one-time comp. secure.

Proof. Start with:



LEMMA. $\text{HYB}(\lambda, 0) \equiv \text{HYB}(\lambda, 1)$.

Proof. By PERFECT SECRECY c is indep. of m_{other}
 thus of b . \square

LEMMA -

$$\text{GAME}(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{HYB}(\lambda, b)$$


For $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

$\forall b = 0, 1$.

Proof. Let A' be PPT s.t.

$$|\Pr[A'(\text{GAME}_{A'}(\lambda, b)) = 1] - \Pr[A'(\text{HYB}_{A'}(\lambda, b)) = 1]| \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$$

Consider reduction A against G :



$$\Pr [b' = 1 : z = G(k); k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda}] = \Pr [\text{GAME}^{\text{prg}}(\lambda, 0) = 1]$$

$$= \Pr [b' = 1 : c = G(x) \oplus m_b; k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda}] = \Pr [\text{GAME}(\lambda, b) = 1]$$

$$\Pr [b' = 1 : z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+l}] = \Pr [\text{GAME}^{\text{prg}}(\lambda, 1) = 1]$$

$$= \Pr [b' = 1 : c = z \oplus m_b; z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+l}] = \Pr [\text{HYB}(\lambda, b) = 1]$$

$$\Rightarrow \left| \Pr [\text{GAME}^{\text{prg}}(\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr [\text{GAME}^{\text{prg}}(\lambda, 1) = 1] \right| \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly } \lambda}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{GAME}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{HYB}(\lambda, 0) \equiv \text{HYB}(\lambda, 1) \approx_c \text{GAME}(\lambda, 1)$$