


1) PRG  $\Rightarrow$  PRF. GGM; PRG  $G(k) = (G_0(k), G_1(k))$

First: Construct PRF with  $n = 1 - \lambda$   
 output  $l = \lambda$

$x = 01$

$F_k(x) = G_1(G_0(k))$



$x$	$y$	$x$	$y$
0	$G_0(k)$	0	\$
1	$G_1(k)$	1	\$

THM If  $G \in \text{PRG}$   
 above  $\forall$  us  $\in \text{PRF}$ .

$$2) \text{ Enc}(k, m) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m) = (c_0, c_1)$$

$$\text{Dec}(k, (c_0, c_1)) = F_k(c_0) \oplus c_1 = m. \quad m \in \{0, 1\}^m$$

THM If  $\mathcal{F}$  a PRF, above  $\Pi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$


is CPA-secure (for fixed-input length  $m = m(\lambda)$ ).

$$\mathcal{F} = \left\{ F_k: \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m \right\}_{k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda} \quad \underline{\underline{F}} \quad \text{IL}$$

Proof. We need to show:

$$\underline{\text{GAME}_{\Pi, \lambda}^{\text{cpe}}(\lambda, b)}$$

$$\text{HYB}(\lambda, b)$$



$\lambda$

$$\kappa \leftarrow \$ V_\lambda$$

$$R \leftarrow \$ \mathcal{R}(\lambda, m, m)$$

$$c = (\kappa, F_\kappa(\kappa) \oplus m); \kappa \leftarrow \$ V_m$$

$$c^* = (\kappa^*, F_\kappa(\kappa^*) \oplus m_b^*); \kappa^* \leftarrow \$ V_m$$


$$c = (\kappa, R(\kappa) \oplus m)$$

$$c^* = (\kappa^*, R(\kappa^*) \oplus m_b^*)$$

LEMMA  $\forall b \in \{0,1\} : \text{GAME}(\lambda, b) \approx_e \text{HYB}(\lambda, b)$ .

Proof. By reduction to PRF security.

For  $b \in \{0,1\}$ ,  $\exists$  PPT  $A'$



LEMMA  $\text{HYB}(\lambda, 0) \stackrel{\sim}{\sim}_S \text{HYB}(\lambda, 1)$ .

Proof. Define BAD to be the event

$\exists i, i \text{ s.t. } \pi_i = \pi; \quad q = \text{poly}$   
 $\in [q]$  # of queries.

The proof follows because:

(i)  $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$

(ii)  $\text{HYB}(\lambda, 0) \equiv \text{HYB}(\lambda, 1)$  conditioning on  $\overline{\text{BAD}}$ .

(ii) Follows because of  $\overline{BAD}$ , each  
 CTX  $C$ , and also  $C^A$  is UNIFORM.

$$(i) \Pr[BAB] = \Pr[\exists i, j \in [q]: i \neq j, r_i = r_j]$$

$$\leq \sum_{i, j} \Pr[r_i = r_j]$$

$$\leq \sum_{i, j} \text{Col}(U_m)$$

$$= \binom{q}{2} \cdot 2^{-m} \leq \text{poly}(q) \cdot 2^{-m} = \text{negl}(q).$$

The statement follows because:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 0) = 1] - P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 1) = 1] \right| \\ &= \left| P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 0) = 1 \wedge B_{AD}] + P_{\nu} [\cancel{H \vee B(\lambda, 0) = 1} \wedge \overline{B_{AD}}] \right. \\ & \quad \left. - P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 1) = 1 \wedge B_{AD}] - P_{\nu} [\cancel{H \vee B(\lambda, 1) = 1} \wedge \overline{B_{AD}}] \right| \\ &= \left| P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 0) = 1 \wedge B_{AD}] - P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 1) = 1 \wedge B_{AD}] \right| \\ &= P_{\nu} [B_{AD}] \cdot \left| P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 0) = 1 \mid B_{AD}] \right. \\ & \quad \left. - P_{\nu} [H \vee B(\lambda, 1) = 1 \mid B_{AD}] \right| \quad \square \end{aligned}$$





Analysis: As we did in other proofs... ~~It~~

Want:

$$| \Pr [ b' = 1 : z_i = F_n(r_i); z_i^* = F_n(r^*) ]$$

$$- \Pr [ b' = 1 : z = R(r_i) \quad z^* = R(r^*) ] \Big| \geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda).$$