

CCA SECURITY


Recap: We know CPA security can
be achieved from OWF (for FIL, VIL).
assuming SHARED Key.

Two missing things:

- 1) Do both at the same time. ✓
- 2) Real-world blockciphers (DES, AES, ...).

DEF (CCA) $\Pi = (Enc, Dec)$ vs

CCA-secure \iff $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{cca}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{cca}(\lambda, 1)$



It implies A

NON-MALLEABILITY

$\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{cca}(\lambda, b)$

~~$C = (K, F(K) \oplus M)$~~




$\mathcal{C} \quad k \leftarrow K$

$c \leftarrow Enc(k, m)$

$c^* \leftarrow Enc(k, m_b)$

$m' = Dec(k, c')$

$(c' \neq c^*)$



Ex. $C = (\kappa, F_k(\kappa) \oplus m) \text{ NOT } C \in A$

(Some for CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR).

Here vs my adversary:

A

$$m_0^* = 0^m, m_1^* = 1^m$$

$$C^* = (c_0, c_1)$$

$$C^1 = (c_0, c_1 \oplus 0^{m-1} = c_1^1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{if } m^1 = 0 \dots 01, b^1 = 0 \\ m^1 = 1 \dots 10, b^1 = 1 \end{aligned}$$

C

$$c_0, c_1$$

$$\kappa^*, F_k(\kappa^*) \oplus 0^m$$

$$\kappa^*, F_k(\kappa^*) \oplus 1^m$$

$$c_0, c_1$$

$$F_k(\kappa^*) \oplus$$

$$\oplus 0^m \oplus 0^{m-1}$$


$$1^m \quad 1$$

Simple recipe to get CCA:

- CPA + AUTH \leftarrow authenticity

DEF (AUTH) $\Pi = (Enc, Dec)$ structures AUTH

\forall PPT A : $\Pr [\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{auth}}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.




C $k \leftarrow \$ K$ VALID!
 $c \leftarrow \$ \text{Enc}(k, m)$
Output 1 if $c^* \neq \{c\}$
 $\text{Dec}(k, c^*) \neq \perp$

THM. CPA + AUTH \Rightarrow CCA.

Proof. Sketch of reduction:

A_{CCA} $\xleftarrow{\text{START}}$ A_{CPA} \in \mathcal{L}_{CPA}



Q: How to get CPA + AUTH?

Combine encryption with message auth?

$$1) C \leftarrow E_{m_c}(k_1, m)$$

$$\tau = \text{Tag}(k_2, m)$$

$$c' = (c, \tau) \quad \text{ENC-AND-AUTH}$$

Never do it! Not secure for evry

Combination of CPA E_{m_c} + UFMA Tag .

Intuition! Tag could leak smt about msg!

$$\overline{\text{Tag}}(x, m) = m[0] \parallel \text{Tag}(k, m) = \tau$$

↳ UFMA

$$2) \quad \tau = \text{Tag}(k_2, m)$$

AUTH-THEN-ENC

$$C \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_1, m \parallel \tau)$$

Not good. There is BAD combination that does NOT work.

TLS uses it (that combination is SECURE).

$$3) \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l} C \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_1, m); \quad \tau = \text{Tag}(k_2, C) \\ \text{Enc}'(k', m) \quad C' = (C, \tau) \end{array} \right.$$

ENC-THEN-AUTH

$$k' = (k_1, k_2)$$

$\text{Dec}'(k', (C, \tau))$: If $\tau \neq \text{Tag}(k_2, C)$ output \perp
Else output $\text{Dec}(k_1, C)$

THM

If $\Pi_1 = (Enc, Dec)$ vs CPA secure


and $\Pi_2 = (Tag)$ vs UFMA (unique tags!)

then $\Pi' = ENC-THEM-AUTH$ vs CCA secure.

Proof. By previous THM we just prove CPA + AUTH.

1) CPA. Simple reduction:

A'_{CPA}



C_1 $k_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_1$


$c \leftarrow Enc(k_1, m)$

$c^* \leftarrow Enc(k_1, m_1^*)$

2) AUTH. Assume not φ : \exists PPT A' such that

$$\Pr[\text{GAME}_{\pi', A'}^{\text{auth}}(\lambda) = 1] \geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda).$$

Construct PPT A_2 against VFCHA:



w.p. $\geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$ we know $\text{Teg}(k_2, c^*) = \tau^* \quad (\text{Dec}(\cdot) \neq \perp)$


We know that $(c^*, \tau^*) \neq \{(c, \tau)\}$

but we need that $c^* \neq \{e\}$ to break VF-CMA. But if the tags are unique

whenever $(c^*, \tau^*) \sim_s \text{FRESH}$ so $\sim_s c^*$. ~~□~~

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Ex. Define STRONG VF-CMA :



Prove : $STRONG\ VFCMA \Rightarrow VFCMA$

$VFCMA \not\Rightarrow STRONG\ VFCMA$