

OPIS: J R 3 P E 3 Z J

EXERCISES

VF-CMA

* We have seen that every PRF is a VF-CMA.
Show the converse is NOT true.


E.g., $T_{eg}(k, m) = F_k(m) \parallel F_k(m)$

PRF \Rightarrow VF-CMA but T_{eg} not a PRF.

PRF \Rightarrow UF-CMA. Do Hybrid s.t. F_k replaced


with $R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(\lambda, m, m)$.

$$G^{\text{ufcma}}(\lambda) \approx_c H(\lambda).$$



$\Pr[H(\lambda) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ because no A.D.V. can guess $R(m^*)$ w.p. better than 2^{-m} .

Tree not a PRF Here is my PPT \mathcal{D} :



\mathcal{L}_{PRF}

$\kappa \in \mathcal{V}_\lambda$

$F_\kappa(x) || F_\kappa(x)$

y

$R(x) \in \{0, 1\}^{2m}$

$\hookrightarrow R \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(\lambda, m, 2m)$

If $y = y' || y''$
 $\overset{m}{\text{len}} \quad \overset{m}{\text{len}}$
 s.t. $y' = y''$
 $b' = 1$

Else $b' = 0$




*) We are given $T_{\text{op}_1}, T_{\text{op}_2}$ s.t. one of them is VF-CMA but we don't know which. Could a VF-CMA T_{op} using $T_{\text{op}_1}, T_{\text{op}_2}$.

$$T_{\text{op}_{k_1, k_2}}(m) = T_{\text{op}_2}(k_2 T_{\text{op}_1}(k_1, m))$$

It works, but restricted to domain of $T_{\text{op}_2} = \text{Range of } T_{\text{op}_1}$

$$T_{\text{op}_{k_1, k_2}}(m) = T_{\text{op}_1}(k_1, m) \parallel T_{\text{op}_2}(k_2, m)$$

Assume Tag_1 vs VFCMA (the other case vs SAME)



*) Some question with PRFs G_1, G_2 .

$$G_2, G_1 : \{0,1\}^l \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{l+l}$$

$$G(s) = G_1(s_1) \oplus G_2(s_2)$$

$$s = \underbrace{s_1}_{\lambda_1} \parallel \underbrace{s_2}_{\lambda}$$

$$G: \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\lambda}$$

$$*) F_k(x) = \underbrace{G'(k)} \oplus x \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \quad \ell > \lambda$$

$$G: \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+\ell}$$

$$G'(s) = G(s) \Big|_{\lambda}$$

\hookrightarrow PRF.

$$x_1 \rightarrow y_1$$

\hookrightarrow TRUNCATES

$$x_2 \rightarrow y_2$$

to λ .

Is F_k a PRF?

$$y_1 \oplus y_2 = x_1 \oplus x_2$$

*) $F_k(\cdot)$ a PRF.

$$F'_k(x) = F_{2k}(x) \quad \text{Is not a PRF?}$$

Observation: $F_k(\cdot)$ could be insecure



for a BAD key, but still a PRF

E.g. $F''_k(x)$ is a PRF

$$F_k(x) = \int_0^1 F''_k(x) \text{ or } x$$

*) Show that no PRG/PRF can be secure against UNBOUNDED ADV.

PRG: $G: \{0,1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$



If yes $b' = 1$
 Else $b' = 0$




$$\Pr_s [b' = 1 : z = G(s)] = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Pr_z [b' = 1 : z \in V_{2\lambda}] = 2^{-1}$$

$$\frac{2^{-1}}{2^{2\lambda}} = \frac{1}{2}$$

PRF : $F_k : \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l$



$k = 0$

x	y
0...0	0
⋮	⋮
1...1	1

If $\exists k$ s.t.
 $F_k(x) = y \quad \forall x$
 $b' = 1$
 Else $b' = 0$

x	y
0...0	⋮
⋮	⋮
1...1	⋮


$y = F_k(x)$
 $y \neq R(x)$
 # Tables $\bar{F}_k(x) = y = 2^l$
 $(2^m \cdot l)$
 2
 # of $R(\cdot)$ tables

*) Let Π be on $S \times E$.

CPA + AUTH \Rightarrow CCA.

Proof. Start with $G(\lambda, b) \equiv \text{GAME}^{\text{CCA}}(\lambda, b)$

$H(\lambda, b)$
 $\text{Dec}(k, c')$
 If $c' \in \{c\}$
 return $m' = m$
 Else \perp



$k \leftarrow V_\lambda$
 $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, m)$
 $m' = \text{Dec}(k, c')$
 $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k, m^*)$

LEMMA. $G(\lambda, b) \approx_c H(\lambda, b) \quad \forall b.$

A

A_{AUTH}

\mathcal{L}_{AUTH} .

\hookrightarrow Assume A can find $c' \in \{c\}$ (FRESH)
s.t. $Dec(k, c') \neq \perp$.

LEMMA $H(\lambda, 0) \approx_\epsilon H(\lambda, 1)$

A_{CCA}

A_{CPA}

\mathcal{L}_{CPA}

⋮

